No news here – EDF doesn’t pay for something again

Something a bit odd is happening in Somerset, and I don’t mean that a new series of Midsomer Murders has been commissioned (I rather think it is set in Somerset, but I’m not sure…). No, the oddness relates to the community bounty promised upon the eventual arrival of Hinkley C nuclear power station in West Somerset.

You will recall, no doubt, the excited announcement by Michael Fallon last year; residents of the local authorities around the plant would be receiving, in addition to retention of the business rate, around £1000 per megawatt hour for up to forty years once the plant was producing power. That might amount to some £128 million all in, which is not bad going at all for cash-strapped local authorities. The previous year, EDF had announced that they would be lavishing some £64 million on local communities to get the project going. So, presumably, like the £5000 per installed megawatt that onshore wind developers are committed to provide for communities (provided that nice Mr Pickles lets them build any) and the 1% of revenues fracking well companies will have to donate to communities if they consent to a well and it actually produces anything, nuclear developers will also be supporting local communities.

Well, not exactly, as it turns out. Pretty much all the money that EDF have provided so far has gone on things that benefit…er…EDF – like widening access roads and so on. And, so I understand, the company has flatly refused to have anything to do with developer benefits subsequently. And following the strong hand DECC played in the negotiations throughout, flat refusal was indeed how it turned out. Only someone had to stump up the community benefit money after Michael Fallon’s possibly injudicious announcement. I am also told that further negotiations with Treasury have proved fruitless.

There have been some suggestions that the lucky authorities who might otherwise benefit from the community payout will share the undoubted bounty of the promised business rate remission. But since the plant itself will be built entirely within the West Somerset district boundary, it is this local authority who will get the whole lot. Other authorities will get nothing, even though they will get a lot of the effects coming their way. West Somerset is understandably reluctant to pass up the equivalent of a large lottery rollover win, so that avenue looks to be closed. The Treasury has now apparently told DECC that they are on their own and that any community benefit will have to be paid out of departmental funds, unless they can get EDF to cough up, which of course they can’t.

So there we are: cash strapped DECC likely to be paying out £128 million for the developer (who will pay virtually nothing in community benefit) over forty years, and local authorities in the area still left a little unclear about how this will all happen. The only good part of this sorry story is there is quite a long time to go before they will have to pay anything out. And perhaps someone will have found some money under a stone by then.

No Michelin stars for the fat dud


The Financial Times ran a piece yesterday, regrettably behind a paywall, that featured the findings of Aurora Energy Research. As the FT quaintly put it, ‘the pot of money ministers have set aside to subsidise UK renewable power is likely to run out much more quickly than previously thought, according to research, placing green energy projects in jeopardy’.

Apparently, the hitherto solid looking pot may turn out to be more like a collapsing bag as uncertainties about just what the pot’s contents may buy burgeon. This is because the sums that will be expended on Contracts for Difference (CfD) will change as the price of energy changes, which the government might have exacerbated anyway by freezing the carbon price floor. DECC doesn’t seem to have taken much of this into account.

To which the correct response should be, I think ‘blimey, you don’t say’ or perhaps more colloquially something like ‘no s*** Sherlock’.

It is good that a research company has now told us that, as an instrument to facilitate and plan investment in renewables, the Levy Control Framework (LCF) is a fat dud, regardless of its efficacy as a method of stopping anyone spending more than a set amount of ‘levy money’ whether what you get for that spend is worth having or not. But a number of people (me included) have been making this point for a long time now. It is perhaps only now that Contracts for Difference are upon us, that the true fat dud-ness of the device can be uncovered.

The point is that the LCF was perhaps not such a fully fat dud when it first came out. After all, it controlled the amount of Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) and feed in tariff (FiTs) payments that could be made. Since both were in fixed sum form you could fairly accurately find out what you might get for what, and importantly, how much you would have in any one year for new entrants based on what you had already committed as fixed amounts. ROCs trading allowed renewables operators additional money from their activities to invest outside the process.

But now, with the more ‘market efficient’ CfD you never quite know what the ‘cost’ of a CfD in any one year will be, since it depends on the relationship over that year between the agreed strike price and the varying ‘reference price’ it seeks to make up the difference between. If you deliberately depress the likely reference price having set a strike price in the first place by, for example, taking some of the increase in carbon floor price out of the equation, then inevitably existing providers will get more money from the ‘pot’ each year. There will then be less from the same pot each year for new entrants.

And worse, as you keep doing that year by year based on a pre-agreed static strike price against a varying reference price, then the margin for new entrants gets smaller and smaller each year.  So that the ability to plan anything new that needs a CfD at a certain time (and contracts specify ‘windows’ within which your CfDs must start, otherwise you lose them, except if you are a nuclear power station) eventually and inevitably, melts away entirely. And to be fair to DECC, who didn’t design the system in the first place, there is nothing you can do about it, once a fixed out turn figure has been set against an inherently variable cost base in the years running up to that agreed figure.

So in terms of planning for renewables to come on stream on the basis of a known underwriting, or as the FT puts it, the sum ‘set aside to subsidise UK renewable investment ‘ the LCF is a complete turkey and has been ever since CfD were invented. If, on the other hand, you don’t care whether much in the way of renewables gets built or that what is built is good value, and you just want to stop whatever it is at the point at which the money stops in 2020, then it looks a bit better.

Except, of course, that come the early 2020’s when new nuclear finally gets off the ground and decides to cash in the monumentally bloated CfD allocation achieved under the ‘investment instrument’ mechanism, the whole edifice will almost certainly come crashing down under the weight of its own contradictions. Which is why, I guess, no-one has attempted to sketch in what might be thought of as some necessary reassurance of what a levy control envelope might look like after 2020.

There, that didn’t need a research report to get straight now did it?


Carbon price support- a bungle too far?

As most people will know, we’ve got two instruments in the UK to price carbon into energy use and investment – the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), and the UK’s, unilateral Carbon Price Support (CPS). I’ve always been a strong supporter of the EU system, and was sorry to see the difficulties it encountered last year. I’ve been a less strong supporter of a unilateral UK carbon price – but I have always thought that if there is to be one, it should be sober, stable and related properly to the European carbon price. So it was in this light that last year, in this very column, I drew attention to the astonishing rises in the indicative future levels of CPS set out by the Chancellor in Budget 2013. These I think, were partially in response to what was seen as a permanent collapse of the EU ETS. Of course the unilateral UK carbon price hike all went straight to the HMT coffers.

In last week’s Budget the Chancellor decided to remove some of his own rises on a policy that has, since its introduction in 2011, veered around like a dodgem car in a fairground. Indeed, the reality of the policy has been the exact opposite of what it was intended to do: to encourage ‘further investment in low carbon generation by providing greater support and certainty to the Carbon price’.  The CPS now looks, as it did in 2013, like a ham-fisted piece of financial opportunism in the wake of the troubles of the EU ETS. The policy would have had to be revised at a future date anyway, especially when, as is now beginning to happen, the EU ETS itself is starting to show some signs of life again. The revision actually acknowledges that possible new life by explicitly relating the ceiling to the performance of ETS over the next few years.

I’m personally not crying buckets over the freeze at an £18 ceiling in its own right. What I think is worrying, however, is the way that the Chancellor’s indecision on what the price should be has destabilised investment rather than encouraged it. Returns on Renewable Obligations and subsequently ‘Contracts for Difference’ for renewable energy projects have a built in assumption behind them about a carbon price trajectory that no longer exists. It certainly looks like funds to support new renewable projects won’t go as far as envisaged because larger payments to existing generators are now likely. Even gas power plant investment is based on higher coal prices as a result of the carbon price; now it looks as if coal will be able to run on the system far longer than had been envisaged. And gas power plant investment may be well be affected by this – unless of course the Government puts more money (our bill costs, that is) into capacity payments to persuade energy companies and other investors to build new power stations.

And that I think is the lesson of last week’s announcement. New energy investment and particularly the low carbon energy investment that we so badly need, does require a reasonably stable and long-term investment environment. The news about the terms of investment doesn’t necessarily have to be great – it just needs to be foreseeable and reliable. The Chancellor’s short-term games with the CPS may look good for this week’s news but will, I am afraid, further destabilise the investment environment. And that is what will count, long term, for the low carbon investment policy that the price support mechanism was apparently originally intended to support.


This article first appeared in the Environmentalist magazine